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Abstract: We propose that a simple “dual-self” model gives a unified explanation for several 
empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin’s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The 
model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O’Donoghue and Rabin 
models of quasi-hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive 
load makes temptations harder to resist. The base version of our model is consistent with the 
Gul-Pesendorfer axioms, but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect 
of cognitive load.     1 
 
 
 
“The idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the psyche 
contains more than one energy system, and that these energy systems have some 
degree of independence from each other.”  
(McIntosh [1969]) 
 
This  paper  argues  that  a  simple  “dual-self”  model  gives  a  unified  explanation  for  a 
number of empirical regularities related to self-control problems and a value for commitment in 
decision  problems.    One  of  these  regularities  is  the  apparent  time  inconsistency  that  has 
motivated economists’ models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: Faced with a choice between 
consuming some quantity today and a greater quantity tomorrow, some people will choose to 
consume the lesser quantity today. However, when these same individuals are faced with the 
choice between the same relative quantities a year from now and a year and a day from now, 
they choose to consume the greater quantity a year and a day from now.
3 A second regularity is 
Rabin’s [2000] paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The paradox is that the risk 
aversion  experimental  subjects  show  to  very  small  gambles  implies  hugely  unrealistic 
willingness to reject large but favorable gambles. In addition, the model provides a possible 
explanation of the effect of cognitive load on self-control that is noted by Shiv and Fedorkin, and 
it predicts that increased costs of self-control lead to increased delay in stationary stopping-time 
problems, as in O’Donoghue and Rabin [2001].    2 
Our theory proposes that many sorts of decision problems should be viewed as a game 
between a sequence of short-run impulsive selves and a long-run patient self. This is consistent 
with recent evidence from MRI studies, such as McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen 
[2004], that suggests that short-term impulsive behavior is associated with different areas of the 
brain than long-term planned behavior.
4 We argue that our dual-selves model explains a broad 
range of behavioral anomalies, and that it is a better (though still crude
5) fit for the modular 
structure of the brain than the quasi-hyperbolic model, which posits a game between multiple 
“selves,” one in each period.  Moreover, the dual-selves model is analytically simpler than the 
quasi-hyperbolic  discounting  model,  as  the  equilibria  of  the  model  can  be  calculated  as  the 
solution to a decision problem. In addition, in standard economic applications where the quasi-
hyperbolic model has multiple equilibria, the dual-self equilibrium is unique. While multiple 
equilibria seem a good way of describing some situations, the unique equilibria of the dual-self 
model are an advantage to the extent that it can explain the empirical facts just as well as models 
with less precise predictions.
6 
In our model, the patient long-run self and a sequence of myopic short-run selves share 
the same preferences over stage-game outcomes; they differ only in how they regard the future. 
Specifically, we imagine that the short-run myopic self has “baseline preferences” in the stage 
game that depends only on the outcome in the current stage. That is, the short-run players are 
completely myopic.
7   
The stage game is played in two phases. In the first phase, the long-run self chooses a 
self-control  action  that  influences  the  utility  function  of  the  myopic  self.  That  is,  at  some 
reduction in utility (for both selves)  the  long-run self can choose preferences other than the 
baseline  preferences.  In  the  second  phase  of  the  stage  game,  after  the  short-run  player   3 
preferences have been chosen, the short-run player takes the final decision. It is important that 
we do not allow the long-run self to precommit for the entire dynamic game. Instead, she begins 
each stage game facing the choice of which preferences to give the myopic self, or equivalently, 
how much self-control to exert.  Note also that while the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model 
emphasizes the conflict between present and future selves, we emphasize that the long-run self 
has the same stage game preferences as the short-run self, and so wishes to serve the interests of 
future  short-term  selves.  Indeed,  while  we  find  the  language  of  multiple  “selves”  to  be 
suggestive, the model can equally well be interpreted as describing the behavior of a single “self” 
whose overall behavior is determined by the interaction of two subsystems.
8 
Games with long-run versus short-run players are relatively simple to analyze, and this 
particular class is especially simple. Imposing a minimal perfection requirement that the short-
run self must always play a best response, the long-run self implicitly controls the short-run self, 
albeit at some cost. For this reason the equilibria of the game are equivalent to the solution to an 
optimization  problem.  In  this  respect,  the  long-run  versus  short-run  player  model  is  more 
conservative than quasi-hyperbolic discounting, preserving many of the methods and insights of 
existing theory, as well as delivering strong predictions about behavior. 
The dual self model predicts a preference for commitment, just as the quasi-hyperbolic 
model does. When dealing with decisions that effect only future options, the short-run self is 
indifferent, hence can be manipulated by the long run self at minimal cost. The long-run self, 
then, has different sorts of mechanisms through which to change the behavior of future short-run 
selves. She  can  intervene  directly  in  a  future  stage  game  by choosing  an  appropriate utility 
function, but to do so may incur a substantial utility cost. Alternatively, in some settings it may 
be possible for the current short-run self to limit the alternatives available to the future short-run   4 
selves; manipulating these decisions has negligible cost. Finally, in some cases the long-run self 
may be willing to incur short run costs to reduce the future cost of self control.  
As an application, we examine a simple one-person savings problem. We show that if the 
short-run self has access to all available wealth, the savings rate is reduced to keep the cost of 
self-control low. On the other hand, when wealth is kept in a bank account, and the short-run self 
that withdraws the money is different from the short-run self who (at a later time) spends the 
money, savings are exactly those predicted in the absence of self-control costs. However, the 
dual self model predicts that the propensity to spend out of unanticipated cash receipts is greater 
than out of unanticipated bank-account receipts. In particular, a sufficiently small unanticipated 
cash receipt will be spent in its entirety, and so winnings from sufficiently small cash gambles 
are  evaluated  by  the  short-run  self’s  preferences,  which  are  over  consumption.    These 
preferences are more risk- averse than the preferences over long-term consumption that are used 
to evaluate large gambles, so this  “cash effect” provides an explanation of  Rabin’s [2000] 
paradox of risk aversion in the small and in the large.
9 
We also apply the dual-self model to the study of procrastination and delay in a stationary 
stopping-time environment that is very similar to that of O’Donoghue and Rabin [2001]. Like 
them,  we  find  that  self-control  costs  lead  to  longer  delays,  but  our  model  yields  a  unique 
prediction,  in  contrast  to  their finding of  multiple  equilibria. Our  model  also  suggests  some 
qualifications to the interpretations that DellaVigna and Malmendier [2003] give to their data on 
health-club memberships.   
Our final application of the model is to the effect of cognitive load on self-control, as 
shown in the experiments of Shiv and Fedorikhin [1999] and Ward and Mann [2000].  We use 
this evidence to motivate the assumption that the cost of self-control is convex, as opposed to   5 
linear.  We then show that agents with non-linear cost of self-control can violate the axiom 
“independence of irrelevant alternatives” when choosing from menus, as well as the version of 
the independence axiom used by Gul and Pesendorfer [2001].  
Our model is similar in spirit to that of Thaler and Shefrin [1981] (from whom we have 
taken  the  McIntosh  quotation  at  the  start  of  the  paper).  Like  them,  we  view  our  model  as 
“providing  a simple  extension  of  orthodox  models  that  permits [self-control  behavior]  to  be 
viewed as rational.” One difference is that their model is defined only for the consumption-
savings problem we study in section 2, while we develop a more general model that can be 
applied to other situations. Also, we work with more precise specifications of the costs of self-
control, and show how to reduce the game between the selves to a single decision problem. This 
makes  the  model  analytically  tractable,  and  enables  us  to  make  more  precise  predictions. 
Independent work by O' Donoghue and Lowenstein [2004] describes a similar but more general 
model,  with  less  focus  on  tractability  and  applications.
10  Bernheim  and  Rangel  [2004],  and 
Benahib and Bisin [2004] consider multi-period models where a long-run self is only sometimes 
in control, either because it is unable to take control (Bernheim and Rangel) or chooses not to do 
so (Benahib and Bisin). We discuss these papers further in the conclusion. Section 5 discusses 
Miao  [2005],  who  applies  the  dual-self  model  to  a  variant  of  the  waiting-time  problem  we 
analyze in that section.   
Although our point of departure is different, the reduced form of the dual self model is 
closely connected to the representations derived in Gul and Pesendorfer [2001,2004],  and Dekel, 
Lipman, and Rustichini [2005]. These papers consider a single player who has preferences over 
choice sets that include the desire to limit the available alternatives. Under various axioms over 
choices over menus of lotteries, they show that the decision process can be represented by a   6 
utility function with a cost of self-control.
11 The reduced form of our model leads to a similar 
decision  problem;  our  interpretation  of  preferences  over  menus  as  arising  from  a  conflict 
between two selves or systems lets us bring both introspective and physiological evidence to bear 
on what those preferences might be. This leads us to a model that is more restrictive in some 
ways, and less restrictive in others; we discuss the relationship in detail in Section 6. Krusell, 
Kuruscu and Smith [2005] examine a variation on the infinite-horizon Gul-Pesendorfer model in 
the setting of a consumption-savings problem.  Within this setting, they consider a wider range 
of preferences; we say more about this in Section 2.   
1. The Model 
Time  is  discrete  and  potentially  unbounded,  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.  There  is  a  fixed,  time-and 
history invariant set of actions ￿ for the short-run selves; this is assumed to be a closed subset of 
a finite-dimensional Euclidean space.
12 We let  ￿  denote the set of all probability measures on 
￿.
13 To encode the effects of past history on current and future payoff possibilities we use a 
second closed subset of a Euclidean space; we denote this space by ￿  and let  ￿ denote the 
probability measures on ￿ . (As an example, in a consumption-savings application the state will 
correspond to wealth, and the action will be the savings rate.) Finally there is a set  ￿ of self-
control actions for the long-run self; R is a closed subset of Euclidean space, and  ￿  are the 
probability measures on  ￿. The point  ￿ ￿ ￿  is taken to mean that no self-control is used. A 
finite history of play ￿ ￿ ￿  consists of the past states and actions,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  or 
the null history 0. The initial state is  ￿ ￿ , the final state in ￿  is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , and the length of the history 
is denoted by  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . The probability distribution over states at time  ￿ ￿ ￿  depends on the time-￿  
state  and  action  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   according  to  the  exogenous  probability  measure  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  so  that   7 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   denotes  the  probability  of  the  set  ￿ ￿   at  time  ￿ ￿ ￿ .  We  make  the  technical 
assumption that for fixed measurable  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is a measurable function of ￿  and ￿. 
Thus  the  short-run  self  is  both  the  short-run  utility  assessor  and  the  “doer”;  all 
interactions with the outside world are handled by the short-run self. The long-run self’s action ￿  
has no direct effect on the future state and serves only to influence the actions of the short-run 
player through its effect on the short-run player’s payoff function   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;
14  this rules out the 
possibility that the state directly encodes the agent’s past use of self-control, as in a model where 
the agent can lower the cost of self control by repeatedly exercising it.  The model is agnostic 
about the exact form of the “influences actions” r;   the model’s observable implications concern 
the actions a.  
We now analyze the game whose players are the long-run self, and the sequence of short-
run selves. Each short-run self plays in only one period, and observes the self-control action 
chosen by the long-run self prior to moving. The mixed strategies of the long-run self are maps 
from histories and the current state to self-control actions,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Denote by  ￿ ￿  the 
set  of  ￿ -length  histories.  A  strategy  for  the  time-￿   short-run  self  is  a  map 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; we denote the collection of all of these strategies by  ￿ ￿ ￿ . In both 
cases we impose the technical restriction that for every measurable subset  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the 
functions  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  are measurable. This means that the strategies together with 
the measure  ￿ give rise to measures  ￿ ￿  over histories of length ￿  for every t; we suppress the 
dependence of these measures on the strategies to lighten notation.  
 The utility of the long-run self is thus given by 
  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   8 
In this formulation, the self-control cost (that is, the difference between  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) 
is borne by both selves. However, since the short-run self cannot influence that cost, all that 
matters is the influence of self-control on the marginal incentives of the short-run self and thus 
on its decisions. 
  At this point, we have not imposed sufficient assumptions to guarantee that discounted 
expected utility is well-defined, as the discounted sum defining ￿  could fail to converge, and the 
expected value of utility at a given state might be infinite. The following assumption ensures that 
the objective function of the long-run self is well behaved.  
Assumption 0 (Upper Bound on Utility Growth): For all initial conditions  
  ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
This requires that the largest values of utility not grow in expected value faster than the discount 
factor, which allows us to interchange the order of the summation and the integral. 
  Now that we have a game between the long-run self and sequence of short-run selves, we 
need to choose an appropriate concept of equilibrium. We refer to a strategy profile in which the 
short-run self optimizes following every history as SR-perfect. We shall only be interested in SR-
perfect Nash equilibria, which are profiles such that the short-run players optimize following 
every history, and the long-run player anticipates how the short-run player will react and plans 
accordingly.  Note that we do not impose subgame perfection on the long-run self, both because 
it  is  not  necessary  for  our  results,  and  because  it  is  not  as  compelling  and  robust  as  the 
requirement of SR-perfection. The point is that each short-run self plays once, and plays a game 
in which expectations of long-run self play do not matter: each short-run self faces a simple static 
decision problem. So while subgame perfection with its long chains of backwards induction is   9 
not  always  plausible,  and  is  not  robust  to  small  changes  in  the  information  structure,  the 
assumption that the short-run self optimizes in every subgame is both robust and compelling.  
Assumption 1 (Costly Self-Control): If  ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Assumption  2  (Unlimited  Self-Control):  For  all  ￿ ￿ ￿   there  exists  ￿ such  that  for  all  ￿ ￿ , 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Under the assumptions that self-control is costly and unlimited, we may define the cost of self-
control 
  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
If we did not impose assumption 2, the self-control cost of some actions in some states could be 
infinite; this would bring the model closer to the addiction model of Bernheim and Rangel. 
Assumption 3 (Continuity):  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is continuous in  ￿ ￿ ￿. 
This assures that the supremum in the definition of ￿  can be replaced with a maximum. 
 
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that the cost function is continuous and has the following property: 
 
Property 1: (Strict Cost of Self-Control) If  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   
   10 
 Conversely,  given  continuous functions  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  satisfying Property 1, we can 
extend that utility function to a function  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  that generates ￿  and satisfies Assumptions 1-
3. For example, if we set ￿ ￿ ￿ , the function 
 
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
has the requisite properties. 
Assumption 4 (Limited Indifference): If  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   for all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then there exists 
a sequence  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
This is a joint restriction on the utility function u and the set of feasible self-control actions R; it 
implies that when the short-run self is indifferent, the long-run self has an action that can break 
the tie for negligible cost.   
  We next consider a reduced-form optimization problem that has only a single player, and 
omits the self-control variable r. Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the set of reduced histories, 
consisting of states and actions only. Choosing a strategy from reduced histories and states to 
actions,  ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ induces distributions  ￿￿
￿ ￿  over histories of length ￿  for every t. 
We assume that that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is measurable in ￿ and ￿ for all measurable  ￿ ￿ .
15 The reduced 
form optimization problem is to maximize the objective function 
  ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  Our goal is to establish equivalence between SR-perfect Nash equilibria of the game and 
solutions to the reduced-form optimization problem. To do so, we must first establish a link   11 
between  strategy  profiles  in  the  game  and  strategies  in  the  optimization  problem.  A  given 
strategy profile ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  gives rise to a stochastic process on the space of states, actions and 
self-control actions, characterized by the conditional probabilities. This in turn gives rise to a 
stochastic process on the space of states and actions only. That stochastic process has associated 
with  it  well-defined  regular  conditional  probability  measures,
16  and  these  conditional 
probabilities define the strategies  ￿￿ ￿ . When such a construction is possible, we say that the 
profile ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is equivalent to  ￿￿ ￿ ; we have just shown that every profile has at least one 
equivalent reduced form strategy.
17  
Theorem 1 (Equivalence of Subgame Perfection to the Reduced Form): Under Assumptions 
1-4, every SR-perfect Nash equilibrium profile is equivalent to a solution to the reduced form 
optimization problem and conversely. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
Remark 1: We have not imposed sufficient assumptions on ￿  and ￿ to guarantee the existence 
of a solution to the optimization problem. If ￿  is finite, it is well known that this problem has a 
solution; however we wish to examine cases where ￿  is infinite, and although in our examples 
existence  of  a  solution  is  unproblematic,  it  is  complicated  to  give  general  conditions 
guaranteeing the existence of an optimum in the infinite case. 
 
Remark  2:  In  the  economic  applications  we  consider,  the  solution  to  the  reduced-form 
optimization problem is unique for generic parameter values.  This is always true if the reduced 
form problem is strictly concave, but a problem that is concave in the absence of self-control 
costs can fail to be concave when self-control costs are significant.   12 
 
  While Assumptions 1-4 are sufficient for the equivalence result in Theorem 1, they are 
too general to be of much use in applications, so our next order of business is to specialize the 
model in a way that still lets it cover the intended applications. In particular, at this point we have 
not made any substantive assumptions about how the utility function depends on the state. Thus 
even though the self-control action r does not have a direct impact on the state, the action a 
played today can change future preferences (through the state variable y) in such a way that the 
cost of self-control is reduced in the future. Such situations are ruled out by the next Assumption, 
which  says  that  the  state  influences  the  cost  of  self-control  only  through  the  current  utility 
possibilities.   
 Assumption 5 (Opportunity Based Cost of Self Control): If ￿ is less satisfying for the short-
run self in state ￿  than in state  ￿ ￿  in the sense that  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , yet state ￿ has greater 
temptation than state  ￿ ￿  in the sense that  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , then it is more 
costly to choose ￿ in state ￿ , that is,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Because the assumption 5’s conditions must hold for all combinations of states and actions, it 
implies  that  the  cost  of  self-control  depends  only  on  the  utility  of  the  best  foregone  option 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and  the  utility  of  the  option  chosen  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Thus  assumption  5  rules  out 
situations in which some states might make self-control more difficult without having any effect 
on the utility possibilities at  0 r = . We explain how to adapt the model to handle this in section 
5, where we discuss how cognitive load influences self-control. Until then, however, we will 
maintain Assumption 5 and assume this possibility away.  Note also that Assumption 5 rules out 
cases where the long-run self is uncertain which action the short-run self will find most tempting.   13 
For this reason, the assumption is most plausible when there is a very short time interval between 
the choice of r and the choice of a. 
Adding Assumption 5 to Assumptions 1-3 implies that there is a continuous function ￿ ￿ 
such that  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where ￿ ￿is decreasing in its first argument 
(the realized utility), increasing in the second (the “temptation”), and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Conversely, 
given continuous functions  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and ￿ ￿ that have these properties, we can use the associated 
cost function C to generate a utility function that satisfies Assumptions 1-3 and 5.   Moreover, 
we show in Section 6 that under these assumptions the induced preferences over menus satisfy 
the set-betweenness axiom of Gul and Pesendorfer. 
  In many of our applications, it is convenient to strengthen Assumption 5 by requiring that 
￿  is linear: 
Assumption 5’  (Linear Self-Control Cost):  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
This assumption provides a tractable and tightly parameterized functional form for the cost of 
self-control, namely that it is proportional to the difference in utility between the best available 
action and that actually taken, where both utilities are evaluated at  ￿ ￿ ￿ . Under Assumption 5’, 
improving  the  best  available  alternative  does  not  change  the  marginal  cost  of  self-control.  
Moreover,  under  Assumption  5’  preferences  satisfy  the  classical  property    independence  of 
irrelevant alternatives. In this sense, these assumptions are conservative, maintaining as much of 
the standard model as is consistent with an interesting theory of self-control. Moreover, as we 
show in section 6, under Assumption 5’ our model is consistent with the Gul and Pesendorfer 
axioms, essentially because it implies the independence axiom of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini 
[1999]. However we argue in Sections 5 and 6 that both Assumption 5’ and the independence   14 
axiom may be too strong, as they rule out the idea that self-control is a limited resource. They are 
also not well motivated in settings where some uncertainty will be resolved after the action of the 
short-run self. To accommodate these aspects of behavior, we do not need to revert to the full 
generality of Assumption 5. Instead, we will use a functional form with one more parameter, 
namely 
    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  Because we have assumed that the long-run self cares only about the utility of the short-
run self, Assumptions 1-5 are in some ways stronger than those of Gul and Pesendorfer. Their 
axioms allow the cost of self-control to depend on  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where the utility function  ￿ 
need not be the utility function used to evaluate choices. At the same time, without the linearity 
assumption  our  assumptions  are  in  some  ways  less  restrictive  than  the  axioms  of  Gul  and 
Pesendorfer and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini. We discuss the connection between our model 
and these papers in some detail in Section 6. 
2. A Simple Savings Model 
To  start,  consider  the  simple  case  of  an  infinite-lived  consumer  making  a  savings 
decision. The state ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  represents wealth, which may be divided between consumption and 
savings according to the action  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  representing the savings rate. Borrowing is not allowed. 
Savings are invested in an asset that returns wealth  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  next period, there is no other 
source of income.
18 
In each period of time, the base preference of the short-run self has logarithmic utility,    15 
  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
where we define ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿.  
The short-run self wishes to spend all available wealth on consumption.  We assume a 
linear cost of self-control, so  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 The reduced form for the long-run self has preferences 
  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
The long-run self’s problem is thus to maximize this function subject to the wealth equation 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .
19  We study the technical details of the problem for the more general CRRA 
case in the Supplementary Appendix. There we show that there is a unique solution, and that the 
solution has a constant savings rate strictly between zero and one.
20  Thus we compute present 
value utility for constant savings rates, and maximize 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   !
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
 
 From the first-order conditions we can then compute that
21  
 
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ ￿
.   (2)   16 
The  comparative  statics  are  immediate  and  intuitive:  As  ￿   increases,  so  self-control 
becomes more costly, the savings rate is reduced, to avoid the cost of self-control. As the long-
run player becomes more patient, (as ￿ increases) this cost of future self control becomes more 
important,  so  the  effect  of  ￿   increases,  which  tends  to  increase  the  difference  between  the 
savings rate at a fixed  ￿  and that at  ￿ ￿ ￿ .  (In particular,  ￿  is irrelevant when  ￿ ￿ ￿ , as the 
savings rate is 0 with or without costs of self-control.)  However, increasing ￿ also increases the 
savings rate for any fixed  ￿ , as is the case when  ￿ ￿ ￿  and there is no self-control problem. 
This latter effect dominates, as total saving increases.  
Note that when  ￿ ￿ ￿ , so there are no self-control costs, the optimum savings rate is 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  In this case the agent’s lifetime utility as a function of initial wealth  ￿ ￿  is  
 
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ! ￿
￿ ￿
;  (3) 
we use this fact in the following section. 
  To summarize, the dual-self model has a constant savings rate for both logarithmic and 
CRRA  utility,  and  the  savings  rate  is  the  solution  to  a  first-order  condition;  the  solution  is 
particularly simple in the case of logarithmic utility. In contrast, as Harris and Laibson [2004] 
emphasize,  consumption  need  not  be  monotone  in  wealth  in  the  usual  discrete-time  quasi-
hyperbolic  model,  even  in  a  stationary  infinite-horizon  environment.    Moreover,  the  quasi-
hyperbolic  model  typically  has  multiple  equilibria  (Krusell  and  Smith  [2003]),  which 
complicates  both  its  analysis  and  its  empirical  application.  In  response,  Harris  and  Laibson 
[2004] propose a continuous-time model of the consumption-savings problem, where the return 
on savings is a diffusion process. They show that the equilibrium is unique in the limit where   17 
individuals  prefer  gratification  in  the  present  discretely  more  than  consumption  in  the  only 
slightly delayed future.
22  Moreover, in our case of constant return on assets, their results show 
that consumption is a constant fraction of wealth if the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1.  
Thus the limit form of their model makes qualitatively similar predictions to ours; we feel that 
the dual-self approach is more general and more direct. 
3. Banking, Commitment, and Risk Aversion 
  In practice there are many ways of restraining the short-run self besides the use of self-
control: the obvious thing to do is to make sure that the short-run self does not have access to 
resources that would represent a temptation. This leads to a value for commitment, and can also 
explain some of the “preference reversals” discussed in the literature. We will shortly develop a 
more complex model where commitment occurs via a cash-in-advance constraint, but as a first 
illustration consider a three-period model where saving is impossible, and baseline consumption 
is constant. Suppose that at period 1 the consumer is offered a choice between two possible 
increases over base-line consumption, either an increase of 1 unit in period 2 or 2 units in period 
3. Since neither option increases short-run consumption, the short-run self is indifferent, and the 
consumer will choose as if she were fully rational, that is, as if her self-control cost were equal to 
0.  On  the  other  hand,  offered  the  choice  between  a  unit  now  and  2  units  in  period  2,  the 
consumer does face a self-control cost in choosing the delayed payoff. Hence for a range of 
parameter values the consumer would choose the larger, later increment in the first decision and 
the smaller, sooner one in the second. 
  Before developing the banking model, we need to address a key unresolved issue in the 
behavioral literature, namely the correct way to model how agents view money rewards. This is 
important,  both  for  our  paper,  and  for  the  interpretation  of  empirical  studies  of  preference   18 
reversal in humans that examine not consumption choices but monetary payoffs.
23 Unless current 
consumption is liquidity-constrained, this evidence  raises a puzzle for both the dual-self and 
quasi-hyperbolic models: since people cannot literally consume currency, why do they act as if 
current monetary rewards are tempting? In brief it seems that the short-run self treats money as a 
cue for an immediate reward even though the only real consequence of earning money is in the 
future,
24 but that observation leaves open the questions of exactly which financial rewards we 
should expect agents  to view as tempting, and what other sorts of deferred rewards will be 
treated in the same way. The conclusion speculates about some possible extensions of our model 
to learned cues, but explaining when and why money is viewed as consumption is beyond the 
scope  of  this  paper.  Instead,  we  will  develop  a  model  where  agents  get  utility  only  from 
consumption, and so are subject to self-control costs only when consumption is possible.   
In particular, we develop a simple model in which basic savings decisions are made in a 
bank, where consumption temptations are not present. In the bank, the decision is made how 
much “pocket cash” to make available for spending when a consumption opportunity arises in 
the following period.
25 Since savings decisions are made in the bank, with perfect foresight, the 
optimum without self-control can be implemented simply by rationing the short-run self.  Thus 
the baseline, deterministic version of the model has an equilibrium equivalent to a model without 
a self-control problem. However, the consumer’s response to unanticipated cash receipts is quite 
different  than  that  to  anticipated  receipts,  or  to  unanticipated  bank  account  receipts:  the 
propensity to consume out of a small unanticipated cash receipt is 100%, while the propensity to 
consume out of a similar amount of money received in the bank account (for example, a small 
capital gain on a stock) is small.   19 
This wedge between the propensity to consume out of pocket cash and to consume out of 
bank cash has significant implications for “risk aversion in the large and small.”  Winnings from 
sufficiently small cash gambles are spent in their entirety, and so are evaluated by the short-run 
self’s preferences, which are over consumption. When the stakes are large, self-restraint kicks in, 
part of the winnings will be saved and spread over the lifetime. This leads to less risk-averse 
preferences, so the model explains the paradox proposed by Rabin [2000].  
The  implication  of  the  pocket  versus  bank  cash  model  are  very  important  in  the 
interpretation  of  experimental  results:  in  experiments  the  stakes  are  low,  but  individuals 
demonstrate substantial curvature in the utility function. Besides exhibiting risk aversion, when 
given the opportunity, for example, to engage in altruistic behavior, they generally do not make 
the minimum or maximum donation, but some amount in between. (Similar behavior is observed 
on the street: many people will make a positive donation to a homeless person, but few will 
empty their pockets of all cash.) If utility is viewed in terms of wealth, this type of behavior 
makes little sense, since the effect of a small donation on the marginal utility of wealth to either 
the donor or recipient is miniscule. Viewed in terms of pocket cash, which is the relevant point 
of comparison when there is a wedge due to the rationing of cash to the short-run self, this 
behavior makes perfect sense. 
   Formally, we augment the simple saving model by supposing that each period consists of 
two  subperiods,  the  “bank”  subperiod  and  the  “nightclub”  subperiod.  During  the  “bank” 
subperiod, consumption is not possible, and wealth  ￿ ￿  is divided between savings  ￿ ￿ , which 
remains in the bank, and cash  ￿ ￿ which is carried to the nightclub. In the nightclub consumption 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is determined, with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  returned to the bank at the end of the period. Wealth 
next period is just  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . The discount factor between the two consecutive   20 
nightclub periods (which is where consumption occurs) is   ￿; preferences continue to have the 
logarithmic form.
26  First, consider the perfect foresight problem in which savings are the only 
source of income. Since no consumption is possible at the bank, the long-run self gets to call the 
shots; and the long-run self can implement 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , the optimum of the problem without self-
control, simply by choosing pocket cash  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be the desired consumption. The 
short-run self will then spend all the pocket cash; because the optimum can be obtained without 
incurring self-control costs, the long-run self does not in fact wish to exert self-control at the 
nightclub. 
  Now we turn to the problem of stochastic cash receipts (or losses). That is, we suppose 
that at the nightclub in the first period there is a small probability the agent will be offered a 
choice between several lotteries. If the lotteries are themselves drawn in an i.i.d. fashion, this will 
also result in a stationary savings rate that is slightly different from the  ￿ ￿  computed above, but 
if the probability that a non-trivial choice is drawn is small, the savings rate will be very close to 
￿ ￿ .  To avoid the small correction terms that would be generated when the lottery has a small but 
non-zero probability, we will consider the limit where the probability of drawing the gamble is 
exactly zero; this simplifies the calculations but is not important for the qualitative features of 
our conclusions. 
  For the agent to evaluate a lottery choice  ￿ ￿ ￿ , he needs to consider how he would behave 
conditional on each of its possible realizations  ￿ ￿ .  The short-run self is constrained to consume 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Next period wealth is given by  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  .   21 
The utility of the long-run self starting in period 2 is given by the solution of the problem without 
self control, as in equation (3): 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
 
The utility of both selves in the first period is  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and so the overall 
objective of the long-run self is to maximize 
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  (4) 
The first order condition for optimal consumption in the nightclub can be solved to find 
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       (5)   
Note  that  when  ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  (5)  simplifies  to 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  as  it  should.  If  
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , the agent will consumer  ￿
￿ ￿ ; otherwise the optimum is to consume all pocket cash, 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Because  ￿ ￿   is  the  solution  for  ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  we  know  that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Thus 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  if 
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 so that 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Note that when  ￿ ￿ ￿ , so there is no self-control problem, so 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : 
in the absence of self-control costs it is never optimal to spend all of the increment to wealth. 
The above establishes 
 
Theorem 2: If the agent receives an unanticipated reward 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  in the nightclub, overall 
utility
27 is  
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If  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  utility is 
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To analyze risk aversion, imagine that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where  ￿ ￿  has zero mean and unit 
variance, and suppose that  ￿  is very small.  Now consider the usual conceptual experiment of 
comparing a lottery with it certainty equivalent.  For small  ￿  and  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , the agent’s overall 
payoff is to a very good approximation given by (6). Thus relative risk aversion is constant and 
equal to 1, where wealth is  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  so risk is measured relative to pocket cash. On the other 
hand, for  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , the utility function (7) is the difference between two others, one of which 
exhibits constant relative risk aversion relative to wealth  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , the other of which exhibits   23 
constant risk aversion relative to pocket cash  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . When  ￿  is small, the former dominates, 
and to a good approximation for large gambles risk aversion is relative to wealth, while for small 
gambles it is relative to pocket cash.
28 Note in particular the asymmetry between losses, for 
which risk aversion is always relative to pocket cash, and sufficiently large gains for which it is 
relative to wealth. 
  We can see this effect graphically in the case of Rabin’s  [2000] paradox of risk aversion 
in the small and in the large: 
 
“Suppose we knew a risk-averse person turns down 50-50 lose $100/gain $105 bets for 
any lifetime wealth level less than $350,000, but knew nothing about the degree of her 
risk aversion for wealth levels above $350,000. Then we know that from an initial wealth 
level of $340,000 the person will turn down a 50-50 bet of losing $4,000 and gaining 
$635,670.” 
 
This is paradoxical in the sense that many people will turn down the small bet, but few if any 
would turn down the second.  
We can easily explain these facts in our model using logarithmic utility. The first bet is 
most sensibly interpreted as a pocket cash gamble; the experiments with real monetary choices in 
which subjects exhibit similar degrees of risk aversion certainly are. Moreover, if the agent is not 
carrying  $100  in  cash,  then  there  may  be  a  transaction  cost  in  the  loss  state  reflecting  the 
necessity of finding a cash machine or bank.  
The  easiest  calculations  are  for  the  case  where  the  gain  $105  is  smaller  than  the 
threshold ￿
￿ ￿ . In this case, logarithmic utility requires the rejection of the gamble if pocket cash   24 
￿ ￿  is $2100 or less.
29 In order for $105 to be smaller than the threshold, we require  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , 
so if  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  is pocket cash, we need a  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , while for  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿  must be of at least 
0.35.
30 However, the conclusion that the gamble should be rejected also applies in some cases 
where  the  favorable  state  is  well  over  the  threshold.  For  example,  if  pocket  cash  is 
$300, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , and wealth is $300,000, then the favorable state of $105 will be well over the 
threshold is $15, but a computation shows that the gamble should be rejected, and in fact it is not 
close to the margin.
31 Indeed, the disutility of the $100 loss relative to pocket cash of $300 is so 
large that even a very flat utility for gains is not enough to offset it. Even if we bound the utility 
of gains by replacing the logarithmic utility with its tangent above $300, not only should this 
gamble be rejected, but even a gamble of lose $100, win $110 should be rejected. 
Turning to the large stakes gamble, unless pocket cash is at least $4,000, the second 
gamble must be for bank cash; for bank cash, the relevant parameter is wealth, not pocket cash. It 
is easy to check that if wealth is at least $4,026, then the second gamble will always be accepted. 
So, for example, an individual with pocket cash of $2100,  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  and wealth of more than 
$4,026 will reject the small gamble and take the large one, as will an individual with pocket cash 
of $300,  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  and wealth equal to the rather more plausible $300,000. 
Sheffrin and  Thaler  [1988]  argue  that  people use  mental accounting  to  mitigate self-
control problems, and that the propensity to spend out of the “current income account” is near 1. 
Our model provides an explicit micro-foundation for their argument and links it to the issue of 
risk aversion; we believe that a similar banking model could be used to explain the fact that 
subjects appear to be “more patient”  in temporal trade-offs that involve larger sums of money, a 
fact  that  is  hard  to  explain  in  models  without  some  way  of    smoothing  consumption  over 
time.
32,33   25 
We  should  point  out  that  other  models  can  yield  these  results.  In  particular,  in  this 
specific case, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model yields the identical prediction about bank 
savings in the first period and second periods, and thus about the response to  unanticipated cash 
shock.  To see this, note that the quasi-hyperbolic model with a bank has an equilibrium that is 
equivalent  to  the  solution  without  self-control  problems.
34  Our  model  of  response  to  an 
unanticipated shock is to maximize the utility function 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Denoting the quasi-hyperbolic discount factor by  ￿ , the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model 
says that the response to an unanticipated shock is to maximize the utility function 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
In both cases, the utility function  ￿ ￿  is the utility function derived by solving the unconstrained 
problem, which is the same in the two cases and equal to the utility function of an agent without 
self-control  problems  ( ￿ ￿ ￿   or  ￿ ￿ ￿ .)    Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   is  not  a  decision  variable  at  this 
“nightclub” stage of the problem, we see that if  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the two objective functions 
differ  only  by  a  linear  transformation,  and  so  necessarily  yield  the  same  preferences  over 
lotteries at the nightclub stage. 
The analysis so far has supposed that cash is only available at the banking stage.  If the 
agent, when banking, anticipates the availability of $300 from an ATM during the nightclub 
stage, and if the target pocket cash holding is $300 or more, then it is optimal to reduce pocket 
cash by the cash machine limit of $300. Of course if the target pocket cash is less than $300, then 
self-restraint will be necessary in the presence of cash machines. Note that this explains why we   26 
find cash machines where impulse purchases are possible: where lottery tickets are sold, for 
example. In equilibrium, few if any additional overall sales are induced by the presence of these 
machines, since their presence is anticipated, but of course the competitor who fails to have one 
will  have  few  sales.  So  one  consequence  of  the  dual  self-model  is  that  we  may  see  an 
inefficiently great number of cash machines.
35 
The  implications  of  the  theory  for  experiments  are  ambiguous  and  complicated.  The 
theory  explains why we  see  substantial  risk  aversion  in  experiments  with  immediate  money 
payoffs. The theory also predicts that people will be less risk averse about gambles that resolve 
in the future, provided they do not resolve in the “night club” state, but that agents will be more 
risk averse when faced with future gambles that will be paid in cash and resolved when the agent 
is in a “nightclub” environment.
36 We are fairly confident that this is true about gambles a year 
or more away, but rather less confident about gambles that pay off in a few days or a few weeks. 
This brings us back to the previously mentioned fact that the psychology of money is not well 
understood. Unfortunately, the theory predicts a high degree of idiosyncrasy in that risk aversion. 
It will depend, for example, on such factors as how much cash the subjects are carrying with 
them, the convenience of nearby cash machines and the like. 
Credit  cards and  checks also pose  complications in  applying the  theory, as for some 
people the future consequences of using credit cards and checks can be significantly different 
than the expenditure of cash. That is, it is one thing to withdraw the usual amount of money from 
the bank, spend it all on the nightclub and skip lunch the next day. It is something else to use a 
credit  card  at  the  nightclub,  which,  in addition  to the  reduction  of utility  from  lower  future 
consumption, may result also in angry future recriminations with one’s spouse, or in the case of 
college students, with the parents who pay the credit card bills. So for many people it is optimal   27 
to exercise a greater degree of self-control with respect to non-anonymous expenditures such as 
checks and credit cards, than it is with anonymous expenditures such as cash.  This conclusion is 
consistent with the finding of Wertenbroch, Soman, and Nunes [2002] that individuals who are 
purchasing a good for immediate enjoyment have a greater propensity to pay by cash, check or 
debit  card  than  by  credit  card,  as  neither  debit  card  statements  nor  checks  show  what  was 
purchased, and debit cards may only show the location of the machine and not the name of its 
operator.  
We should emphasize that this version of the nightclub model is very stark in both its 
assumptions and in the prediction of 100% propensity to consume out of small amount of cash. 
The explanation of the Rabin paradox, however, is driven by the fact that the propensity to 
consumer out of cash is higher than the propensity to consume at the bank. For example, if there 
were several nightclub  period before returning to the bank,  in the earlier periods some self-
control would be used, and the marginal propensity to consume out of cash would be less than 
100%. Nevertheless, the marginal propensity to consume out of small amounts of cash would be 
higher than if the money was received at the bank, and we conjecture that the qualitative features 
of the analysis would be preserved, though a careful analysis of this extension would require 
additional work.  
Finally, we should point out that even without a self-control problem, fear of theft can 
also lead agents to impose binding constraints on their ability to draw against wealth in nightclub 
periods, and so predicts that unanticipated losses must be absorbed from consumption. This fear-
of-theft model predicts that unanticipated gains will be treated the same regardless of whether 
they are received in cash or in the bank. Thus for choices between gambles that have only small   28 
gains, the “fear of theft” model predicts little risk aversion, while the dual self predicts that risk 
aversion will be substantial. 
4. Procrastination and Delay 
  O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999], [2001] use quasi-hyperbolic preferences to explain how 
self-control problems can lead to procrastination and delay. We can use the dual-self model to 
make similar predictions. Specifically, consider the following model: Every period  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ the 
short-run  self  must  either  take  an action  or  wait.  Waiting allows  the  self  to enjoy  a  leisure 
activity that yields a stochastic amount of utility  ￿ ￿ , whose value is known at the start of that 
period; think for example that the leisure activity is playing outside and its utility depends on the 
weather.  We suppose that the  ￿ ￿  are i.i.d. with fixed and known cumulative distribution function 
P and associated density p on the interval ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and mean  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Taking the action ends the 
game, and results in a flow of utility ￿ beginning next period, and so gives a present value of  
 
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.  
If the agent waits, the problem repeats in the next period.
37 
Except  for  the  use  of  the  dual-self  model,  this  model  is  very  similar  to  that  of 
O’Donoghue and Rabin [2001], who consider quasi-hyperbolic preferences in a stationary, a and 
deterministic environment.
38  We compare the models after deriving our conclusions.   
Because the current value of ￿  has a monotone effect on the payoff to waiting, and no 
effect on the payoff to doing it now, the optimal solution is a cutoff rule: If  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then wait, 
and if  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  take the action.  The maximum utility that the agent can attain in any period is  ￿ ￿ ,   29 
which is the payoff to waiting, while doing it now requires foregoing  ￿ ￿ .  Hence waiting incurs 
no self-control cost, and acting has self-control cost of  ￿ ￿ ￿ .   
Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   denote  the  value  starting  tomorrow  when  using  cut-off  x, 
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  and 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  the  value  of  waiting  today  when  the 
leisure activity is worth x is 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and the value of acting  is  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . The expected 
present value tomorrow if the action is not taken today and cutoff rule  ￿ ￿  is used in the future is 
then given by  
  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
so that   
  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
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￿
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￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
  (8) 
  We assume that when the opportunity cost is at it lowest possible value  ￿ , the  present 
value of acting is greater than the present value of waiting forever:   
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, or equivalently,  
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￿
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￿
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When the reverse inequality holds, an agent without self-control costs will never act.  For the 
time being we also assume that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so that an agent without no cost of self-control would 
choose to delay when ￿  is close to ￿ .   This combination of assumptions rules out the 
deterministic case studied by O’Donoghue and Rabin.    30 
Theorem 3   (i)    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; if  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
(ii)  When  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (9).  
Moreover, 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ , so expected waiting time is increasing in the cost of self control.   
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
  Let  ￿ ￿  (for “naïve”) be the cutoff the agent would use if forced to make a choice between 
stopping now and never stopping.  Then  
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 
When  the  optimal  rule  is  interior,  the  agent  eventually  does  choose  to  stop,  and  so  the 
continuation value 
￿ ￿  exceeds  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , and equation (9) shows that 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . This shows that 
the standard “option value of waiting” consideration carries over to the dual-self model. 
  In independent work, Miao [2005] applies a dual-self model to a very similar problem. 
He considers the cases of immediate costs and future benefits, as here; immediate benefits and 
future rewards, where the temptation is to act too soon, and immediate costs and immediate 
rewards. His model of future benefits differs from ours in that the long-run benefit is stochastic 
and the short-run cost is fixed, as in the literature on wage search.
39 
O’Donoghue and Rabin [2001] analyze the implications of quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
in a deterministic and stationary infinite-horizon stopping- time problem. They consider a range 
of assumptions about the agent’s beliefs about his own future preferences; we will focus on the 
case of “sophisticates” who are correctly perceive their own self-control problems. For these   31 
sophisticates, they show that in any pure-strategy equilibrium there is an “intended delay”  ￿  
such that in every period where the agent plans to do the task, he must predict that waiting would 
lead to a delay of exactly d periods. We view these cyclic equilibria as artificial and unappealing; 
they also complicate the analysis of the equilibrium set.
40   
One obvious  difference  between  their  conclusions  and ours  is  that  in  a  deterministic 
setting, our model predicts that the agent either acts at once or never acts; partial delay is never 
observed. Some readers have suggested that our model makes the wrong prediction here, but we 
are  not  convinced  of  this.  Most  real-world  stopping  time  problems  have  both  a  stochastic 
component (either in costs and benefits, or simply in feasibility of acting at certain dates) and 
some  non-stationarity,  and  we  are  unaware  of  relevant  experimental  data.    Moreover,  the 
assumptions of Theorem 3 concern only the support of the distribution of opportunity costs, and 
not the distribution itself; the assumptions are consistent with there being a very high probability 
of costs in a small interval.  Thus, the appropriate question is not whether observed behavior 
resembles  the  prediction  of  our  model  in  a  deterministic  stationary  environment,  but  the 
calibration  question  of  whether  the  amount  of  uncertainty  and  non-stationarity  required  for 
observed delays is plausible. In a related vein, note that if O’Donoghue and Rabin sophisticates 
were constrained to place a small minimum probability on each action,  as in a trembling-hand 
perfect  equilibrium,  then  their  model  predicts  there  would  be  delay  cycles;  we  would  be 
surprised if such cycles were observed.  
To further explore the relationship between the dual-self and quasi-hyperbolic models, in 
the appendix we extend the O’Donoghue and Rabin analysis of sophisticates to the stochastic 
environment presented above.  Our analysis shows that when the support of the random term is 
sufficiently broad, the quasi-hyperbolic model has a stationary equilibrium that is  qualitatively   32 
similar to the unique outcome of the dual-self model. Unlike the dual self model, though, there 
are typically has multiple equilibria. For example, there can be equilibria in which the agent uses 
cut-off  ￿ ￿  in odd-numbered periods and uses cut-off  ￿ ￿  in even-numbered periods.
41   Of course 
one can get a unique stationary equilibrium from the quasi-hyperbolic model here simply by fiat, 
that is by deciding to rule out all other equilibria; we think it is more satisfactory to have this be a 
result than an assumption.  
Theorem 4:   
a)  If  ￿ ￿ ￿   and  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,  the  “sophisticated  quasi-hyperbolic  model”  has  a  stationary 
equilibrium with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
b) There is an open set of parameters that satisfies the restrictions of part a) and for which there 
are other equilibria. 
 
The proof is in the Supplementary Appendix.  
DellaVigna and Malmendier [2003] report some calibrations of the O’Donoghue-Rabin 
model  to  data  on  delay  in  canceling  health  club  memberships,  which  they  attribute  to  a 
combination  of  quasi-hyperbolic  preferences  and  “lack  of  sophistication,”  meaning  that 
consumers misperceive their own quasi-hyperbolic parameter and thus incorrectly forecast their 
health club usage.
42  Our model suggests several qualifications to their analysis.  First of all, as is 
standard in models of timing, it is not in general optimal for the agent to act whenever he is 
indifferent between acting now or not at all, as there is an “option value” in waiting.
43  Second, 
while there is some evidence that agents do not have perfect knowledge about themselves, we 
expect  them  to  have  more  information  about  things  that  they  have  had  more  chances  to   33 
observe.
44 Thus it seems natural to assume that the misperceptions about the short-run disutility 
and long-run benefits of going to the health club are larger than misperceptions about their own 
impulsiveness, and of course these former misperceptions can also explain the excessive delay.
45   
We can also compare the dual-self model to the deterministic, finite horizon model of 
O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999], which allows non-stationary costs.  In their Example 1, there are 
4 periods to do a report, with costs 3, 5, 8, 13, and value ￿.  Applying our model to this problem, 
we see that in the final period there is no self-control problem, so the payoff to acting is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . 
In the next to last period the short-run self gets 0 from waiting,  -8 from acting, so the utility if 
doing now is  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; in the previous periods the payoffs are  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
respectively. The solution in our model depends on ￿ : If   ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , the agent acts at the start, 
and if prevented from doing so, then act immediately when given the chance; if  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , the 
agent never acts. Thus (except for the knife-edge case of  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) the agent never plans to act 
in  intermediate  periods.  The  equilibrium  of  the  quasi-hyperbolic  model  with  sophisticates 
depends on  ￿ .  For a range of values around  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , as the sophisticated agent acts in the 
second period, but intends to wait until the fourth period if prevented from acting when planned. 
Basically this equilibrium corresponds to one of the unappealing cyclic equilibria in their infinite 
horizon model; with an odd number of periods, the equilibrium is for the sophisticated agent to 
act in the first, third and fifth periods.
46 
5. Cognitive Load and Non- Linear Cost of Self Control 
  In  this  section  we  show  how  to  extend  our  dual-self  model  to  capture  the  effect  of 
cognitive load on the cost of self-control. This is of interest both as an illustration of the scope 
and tractability of the model, and as a motivation for exploring the case of a non-linear cost of 
self-control report. Our starting point is the following experiment by Shiv and Fedorikhin [1999]:   34 
Subjects were asked to memorize either a two- or a seven-digit number, and then walk to a table 
with a choice of two deserts, namely chocolate cake and fruit salad.  Subjects would then pick a 
ticket for one of the deserts, and go to report both the number and their choice in a second room. 
In one treatment, actual samples of the deserts were on the table, and in a second treatment, the 
deserts were represented by photographs. The authors hypothesize that subjects will face a self-
control problem with respect to the cake, in the sense that it will have higher emotional appeal 
but be less desirable from the “cognitive” viewpoint; that the subject’s reaction is more likely to 
be determined by the emotional (“affective”) reaction when cognitive resources are constrained 
by the need to remember the longer number, and that this effect will be greater when faced with 
the actual deserts than with their pictures.
47  The experimental results confirm these predictions. 
Specifically, when faced with the real deserts, subjects who were asked to remember the seven-
digit number chose cake 63% of the time, while subjects given the easier two-digit number chose 
cake 41% of the time, and this difference was statistically significant. In contrast, when faced 
with the pictures of the deserts, the choices were 45% and 42% respectively, and the difference 
was not significant.
48 
The finding that increasing cognitive load increases responsiveness to temptation can be 
easily captured in our model by the assumption that the marginal cost of self-control is higher 
when the long-run self, which we identify with cognitive processing, has other demands on its 
resources. In order to accomplish this, we need to allow the cost of self-control to be dependent 
on the state  ￿ . Let ￿  be the cognitive resources consumed by tasks other than self-control. In 
this application, it is natural to identify the state ￿  as the level of cognitive load d. This enables 
us to consider situations in which there are different levels of cognitive load.   35 
To use our framework formally, we need to specify how the state, as measured by the 
external cognitive load  ￿ , impacts on self-control costs. One possibility is to assume that the 
cognitive center has a fixed amount ￿  of cognitive resources, and that the resources required for 
self-control are proportional to the short-run foregone utility. Then when other cognitive tasks 
are consuming ￿  resources, the utility of the short-run self can be reduced by at most  ￿ ￿ ￿ ; 
greater self-control is simply infeasible. Alternatively, we suppose that the cognitive center does 
not face a fixed resource constraint, but instead has increasing marginal cost as ￿  increases. In 
the former case, Assumption 2 is violated, since some actions have infinite costs. Moreover, 
neither version makes sense with the linearity assumption, 5’. Specifically, we want to explain 
how ranking are changed by self-control costs, so that we want the cognitive load ￿  to change 
the ranking of alternatives.  
To make a formal connection with our model, let the possible actions be h (chocolate) 
and f (fruit). The short-term utilities (before subtracting any costs of self control or cognitive 
load) are 
￿ ￿  and 
￿ ￿ , with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so there is no self-control cost in choosing ￿ . To make this 
into a self-control problem we also assume that the long-term utility of fruit is higher than that of 
chocolate.  Recall that we identify the state  ￿  with the external cognitive load d.  Then, from 
assumption 5, the self-control cost of action  ￿  with load d is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . To explain 
the data we need this cost to be increasing in d.  
 One way to explain the Shiv and Fedorikhin data would be to set  
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
This  linear  specification  is  consistent  with  the  linearity  assumption  A5’,  but  seems 
unsatisfactory: If using cognitive resources for memorization increases the marginal cost of self-  36 
control, then we would expect that using these resources for self-control should also change the 
marginal cost of self control, and hence the ranking of alternatives. That is, we would expect that 
having a more attractive foregone alternative should have the same effect as a higher value of ￿ .  
We therefore prefer the non-linear specification  
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
where g is an increasing convex function with  ￿ ￿   ￿  and    ￿   ￿ . While the linear and non-
linear formulations are equivalent on the data of the “deserts” experiment, they make different 
predictions  about  how  behavior  changes  when  a  third  alternative  is  added,  as  we  show  by 
example in the next section. In addition, the non-linear formulation, but not the linear one, fits 
the psychological evidence that self-control is a limited resource, as discussed by Muraven, Tice 
and Baumeister [1998] and Muraven and Baumeister [2000]. 
  To accommodate this additive cost of load, we weaken Assumption 5 as follows. Let 
￿￿ ￿ ￿  be the amount of cognitive load in state y. 
Assumption 5” (Cost of Self Control with Cognitive Load) If  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
To  make  a  precise  connection  between  this  example  and  our  general  model,  let  ￿ ￿   be  the 
minimal amount of self-control needed to choose f, which we assume to be a constant that is not 
influenced by the state. Set 
  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ;  ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ , and  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   37 
By definition,  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so that the given utility functions imply the non-
linear cost specification  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
One could also explain the effect of cognitive load in the quasi-hyperbolic  model by 
assuming that the parameter   ￿  decreases when the cognitive center has other tasks.  This is 
roughly analogous to our proposal, but to us it seems more natural and direct to assume that 
cognitive load uses up self-control resources. 
The effect of substituting photographs for the actual deserts shows the importance of cues 
and framing: The evidence supports Lowenstein’s [1996] theory that vividness influences the 
effect of temptation.  
6. Axiomatizations of Self Control 
At  this  point,  we  would  like  to  relate  our  model  to  the  axiomatizations  of  Gul  and 
Pesendorfer and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini.
49 As we indicated earlier, their axioms need not 
be satisfied if we make Assumption 5 but not the stronger Assumption 5’. To make this claim 
precise, we use a dynamic programming approach to reduce our dynamic problem to the two-
period problems considered in Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini 
[2005].
50 So we now suppose that the initial period action ￿ has no utility consequences for the 
short-run self, and serves solely to establish the state ￿  determining utility possibilities starting 
in period 2, as the banking action does in the model of Section 4.  For any initial period choice of 
action, we can then consider the feasible actions in period 2. These period-2 actions determine 
both the second-period utility ￿  of the short-run self, and also (by determining the future value 
of the state) the flow utilities ￿ at all future dates; these correspond to a present value of ￿  for 
the long-run self starting in period 3. Thus self-control is only an issue in period 2.    38 
From the viewpoint of the long-run agent at the start of the second period, what matters are 
the feasible utility consequences ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so we can think of the long-run self in the initial period 
as choosing a set of feasible ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  pairs. In our model, the resulting utility to the initial long-run 
self choosing the set ￿  is given by  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
This gives rise to a preference ordering over sets ￿  and we can ask when and whether this 
preference ordering satisfies various axioms.  
  Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] show that their axioms are equivalent to a representation  
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
When  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
we take  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so  under Assumption 5’ our model is consistent 
with the axioms.
51    
On the other hand, when ￿  is not linear, as in our preferred explanation of the cognitive 
load experiment, our model is consistent with neither their axioms nor the weaker ones of Dekel, 
Lipman, and Rustichini.  To see that a non-linear C is inconsistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer 
axioms, consider Example 2 of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini. There are three possible actions, 
broccoli (b), frozen yogurt (y), and ice cream (i), with ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿ ￿ ￿  and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ . Here 
the frozen yogurt is a “compromise” option that is appealing in the face of strong temptations but   39 
not  when  faced  weaker  ones.  Dekel,  Lipman,  and  Rustichini show  that this  preference over 
choice sets is not consistent with the Gul and Pesendorfer axioms, but it is consistent with their 
more general axioms. It is also consistent with our Assumptions 1-5: take ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ; 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , and let 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Then  confronted  with  the  choice  between  b  and  y  the  long-run  self  computes  the  value  of 
broccoli to be " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ # ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , which exceeds the value of yogurt, which is 35 in both the set 
￿￿ ￿ !￿   and  the  set  ￿￿ ￿ .  However,  in  the  choice  set  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿,  the  value  of    yogurt  is 
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ,  the  value  of  ice  cream  is  14,  and  the  value  of  broccoli  is 
" ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .
52   
Note that the choice function of our agent in this example violates the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, as he chooses y from  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿  but b  from  ￿￿ ￿ !￿ .  Dekel, Lipman and 
Rustichini propose a different explanation for the same preferences,  based on the idea of that the 
long-run self is uncertain of the short-run self’s choice function; their explanation satisfies a form 
of independence of irrelevant alternatives for stochastic choice functions.
53 Notice also that when 
self-control  costs  are  linear,  the  action  that  will  be  chosen  from  a  set  ￿   is 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  so  that  the  temptation 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is a  “sunk cost” that does not effect the plan ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  that will be chosen 
from ￿ . In other words, in the case of linear cost, the independence of irrelevant alternatives is 
satisfied.   40 
In addition to leading to violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-linear 
self-control costs also lead to a violation of the independence axiom on sets of lotteries used by 
Gul and Pesendorfer and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini.
54  To see this, consider a lottery that 
takes place after ￿ is chosen by the short-run self, so that  ￿ ￿ ￿  represent random variables rather 
than constants. In our model, what matters to either the short- or long-run self is the expected 
present value of this lottery, so our ranking over choice sets is given by 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
But this ranking can violate the independence axiom, because it is not given by an expected 
value, but rather by a non-linear function of an expected value.
55 Our conclusion is that in this 
setting the independence axiom is less compelling here than in the standard model.
56 In terms of 
observed choices, the independence axiom implies that we would see the same distribution of 
choices if the two dessert options were replaced by lotteries that gave a probability  " of the 
chosen desert and probability  ￿ " ￿  of no desert at all. By way of contrast, our model with 
convex costs implies that more agents should chose fruit when the probability  " of a desert is 
lower.    
  To complete the comparison of our model to the current literature on the axiomatization 
of preference for self-control, we show that our Assumption 5 implies set-betweenness. This 
shows that the  linearity restriction of Assumption 5’  is not needed for set-betweenness,  and 
conversely that the set-betweenness axiom on its own is not sufficient for Gul and Pesendorfer’s 
representation  theorem.  It  also  shows  that  Assumption  5  rules  out  the  preferences  in Dekel, 
Lipman, and Rustichini’s Example 1, which are  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! !￿ ￿ ,￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! !" ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !" !￿ " ￿ , 
and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ !￿ " ￿ . These preferences could describe a situation where the long-run self is   41 
uncertain which of h and p  will be more tempting, so the example illustrates the fact that our 
model requires that no uncertainty is realized between the time that the long-run self chooses r 
and the time that the short-run self picks a.  As we remarked in Section 2, this is more plausible 
when this time interval is very short.   
Theorem 5: Under Assumptions 1-5, the induced preferences  ( over choice sets satisfy set-
betweenness. That is, for all choice sets  ￿ ￿ #  either ￿ ￿ # # ) ￿ ￿  or # ￿ # ￿ ) ￿ ￿ . 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
  In summary, our Assumptions 1-5 imply the set-betweenness property assumed by Gul 
and Pesendorfer, but are not consistent with their axioms taken as whole; on the other hand their 
axioms are more general about the nature of temptations. The extra generality obtained by 
dropping linear costs is needed to explain the effect of self-control when the short-run self is 
choosing between lotteries, and to model the idea that self-control is a limited resource. The 
usual arguments and evidence for independence of irrelevant alternatives and the independence 
axiom are not compelling when an intermediate decision such as self-control is involved. More 
generally, once one leaves the domain of the standard model, where the assumptions on behavior 
have some normative appeal, it becomes more difficult to evaluate axioms on  a priori  grounds. 
In this situation insights from psychology and neuroscience, such as the presence of multiple 
systems within the brain that respond differentially to the timing of rewards,  can be particularly 
useful in suggesting useful assumptions. We have chosen what we feel is the most 
straightforward way to capture these insights, namely to cast them as assumptions on the implicit 
preferences of the various systems or selves. This is simple and direct, but unlike the axiomatic 
approach, it does not lead to a complete characterization of the behavioral implications of what   42 
has been assumed. We think such a characterization would be interesting and useful, but it is a 
topic for further research. 
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
  Sections 2, 3, and 4 show how a tightly parameterized version of the dual-self model can 
be  used  in  some  simple  economic  settings  that  have  previously  been  analyzed  with  quasi-
hyperbolic utility. We are confident that the dual-self model would have  similar advantages in 
other settings  where quasi-hyperbolic utility has been applied, for example to Laibson’s [1997] 
finding that quasi-hyperbolic consumers overinvest in illiquid assets as a commitment device, so 
that their consumption is more correlated with income shocks than it would be in the standard 
model. More speculatively, we conjecture that the dual-self model with a bank can explain the 
“magnitude effect” in time discounting.  In addition, we conjecture that the dual-self model with 
complete information can explain the co-variance of effort and consumption that Brocas and 
Carrillo [2005] derive in a dual-self model where the long-run self does not know the preferences 
of the short-run selves: Suppose that each period the agent simultaneously chooses hours worked 
and consumption, and that the wage is stochastic. When the wage is high, the long-run self 
wishes to work more, and if the cost of self-control is non-linear, the increased effort should be 
accompanied by an increase in consumption (or other forms of short-run gratification) to reduce 
the cost of self-control.    
Our resolution of the Rabin paradox shows how the dual self model can capture some 
sorts  of  context  effects,  as  the  model  makes  different  predictions  about  the  response  to 
unanticipated payments depending on whether they are received on the floor of a casino or the 
lobby of a bank.  Cues are obviously the key to understanding the effect of context in general and 
framing in particular.  The dual self theory implies that it is the attention span of the short-run   43 
self that is relevant for determining what constitutes a “situation, ” which is the most difficult 
modeling issue in confronting these types of issues. This suggests that one might be able to use 
experimental and physiological data to determine the relevant contexts and frames.  The dual self 
theory would then enable us to paste information about the motivation of the myopic self into the 
broader context in which real decision making takes place.  
Most existing work on cues, such as Laibson [2001] and Bernheim and Rangel [2004], 
abstracts away from self-control costs. Laibson analyzes a “rational addiction” model. This is a 
model with a single, fully rational, agent, in a setting where there are two cues, namely “green 
lights ” and “red lights.” The utility from engaging in the addictive utility when a given light is 
on depends on one’s past behavior under that particular light. Because it is based on rational 
choice, the model has a unique equilibrium, but that equilibrium has four steady states: never 
indulge, always indulge, indulge iff green, and indulge iff red.  This shows how the agent’s 
experience can determine the importance of the cues, but does not allow the agent to have a 
preference for self-control. Bernheim and Rangel [2004] consider an addiction model where the 
agent sometimes enters a “hot mode” in which he consumes the addictive good whether or not 
his “cool self” wants him to.
57 This model, like ours, captures a value for self-control while 
avoiding the multiple equilibria of a multiple-selves model, but it differs in a number of respects. 
Most notably, in their model self control is costless in the cool mode and infinitely costly in the 
hot one, and the actions of the agent in the hot mode can be called “mistakes.”
58  
More broadly, from the viewpoint of observed choices there may not be much difference 
between regretting a mistaken choice and regretting an action that would not have been taken if 
one’s self-control cost had not been unusually high. Our Assumption 2 rules out infinite costs, 
but the fact the self-control is sometimes possible, albeit costly, is what underlies our finding that   44 
the agent responds differently to small versus large gambles in our banking model: a sufficiently 
large windfall will trigger self control and the long-term perspective. 
We focus on the case of “sophisticated” agents who are aware of their own self-control 
costs.  Many papers on self-control problems consider the case of “naïve” agents, who have a 
current self-control problem but incorrectly forecast that they will not have such problems in the 
future.  For  example,  O' Donoghue  and  Lowenstein  [2004]  consider  an  extension  similar  to 
allowing agents to misperceive the future value of  ￿ . O' Donoghue and Lowenstein also point 
out that that if the current long-run self  has correct expectations but does not care about future 
costs of self control, the decision making process becomes a game between the long-run selves, 
and the result is equivalent to the usual quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
59 
All models of self-control raise the issue of how the preferences of the different selves 
should be weighted in thinking about welfare analysis. Because the long-run self in our model 
has the same short-run preferences as the short-run self, the utility of the long-run self seems to 
be the obvious welfare criterion, just as it is in the models of Bernheim and Rangel [2004] and  
of Benahib and Bisin [2004].  This approach follows traditional welfare economics in preserving 
the idea of consumer sovereignty in the sense that there is a single set of preferences for the 
consumer  that  are  taken  as  primitive  for  welfare  analysis.  In  other  models,  consumer 
sovereignity may be less compelling or fail to make sense, and the appropriate notion of welfare 
is less obvious, for example if agents are quasi-hyperbolic, or in a dual-self model where the 
long-run self and short-run self have different short-run preferences.
60  
An important, yet complicated, extension of the model is to allow the preferences of the 
short-run selves to respond in some way to future consequences.  The related work of Benhabib 
and Bisin [2004] does allow for one form of this responsiveness. They consider a consumption-  45 
savings model in which exercising self-control is a 0-1 and costly decision, made by a “cognitive 
control center” that corresponds to the long-run self in our model. Temptation is stochastic, and 
its strength is determined by an exogenous i.i.d. sequence of cues, so that costly self-control is 
only used when giving in to temptation is sufficiently costly. The equilibrium again corresponds 
to the solution of an optimization problem by the long-run self, who takes the behavior rule of 
the affective self as given.  In contrast to our own paper and other related work, the behavior of 
the  “affective  self”  (the  mental  unit  that  is  susceptible  to  temptation)  is  not  required  to  be 
myopic. Instead,   the affective self’s strategy can depend on expectations of future play, but it 
must  be  independent  of  the  distribution  of  temptations  and  the  cost  of  self  control.  As  an 
example,  they suggest  the case  where the behavior of the affective self is a Markov-perfect 
equilibrium  of  the  game  where  self-control  is  impossible.  If  the  actual  outcome  is  that  the 
cognitive  center  does  sometimes  exercise  self-control,  this  raises  the  question  of  how  the 
adaptive selves would come to learn the equilibrium play of the wrong game.
61  
Instead of following the expectations-based approach, we would like to model the long-
run self having “taught” the short-run self to attach positive affective weight to certain variables 
that have long-run consequences, as in the learning of cues. Here the use of stimulus-response 
models of learning may play an important role. The standard forms of these models seem to be a 
poor fit for many aspects of human cognition.
62 For example, faced with no observations people 
will respond differently depending on their prior knowledge of a situation.
63 More strikingly, we 
know  that  people  can  learn  by  “figuring  things  out”  without  any  external  stimulus  at  all. 
However, these cognitive activities can be sensibly  regarded as aspects of the long-run self, 
while it makes sense to model the expectations of the short-run self as arising from a process of 
stimulus-response learning that depends solely on the past history, and does not involve forward-  46 
looking expectations. We would then theorize, based on introspection and casual empiricism, 
that the long-run self can train the short-run self by manipulating this stimulus-response learning. 
This leads to the possibility of the deliberate formation of “habits” with a view towards lessening 
the cost of self control. It also raises the conjecture that the use of “rules of thumb” like “only 
have sweets at dinner” aids self-control by reducing the vividness of the temptation.  One way to 
investigate this would be to first try to identify the use of rules of thumb by observing choices 
and perhaps administering questionnaires, and then show agents pictures of various foods while 
in a scanner, asking them to choose which food to have at the end of the experiment.  
Finally, we should point out that the presence of self-control leads to some potentially 
perverse  implications  for  public  policy.  For  example,  as  Wertenbroch  [1998]  discusses,  a 
common  self-control  strategy  is  to  reduce  temptation  by  avoiding  stockpiling  of  durable 
“temptation goods.” As an example, he points to the fact that some people buy cigarettes only by 
the pack even though cartons are much cheaper. The rationale is that this reduces the temptation 
of having lots of cigarettes around the house, and so mitigates the cost of self-control. Suppose a 
law was passed that cigarette store were open only on the first day of each month. Then some 
people  who  would  otherwise  have  purchased  cigarettes  by  the  pack  will  instead  choose  to 
stockpile cartons for the month. In the face of the greater temptation, their smoking will be 
increased. Of course, other people may reduce or quit smoking as a result of the law, so the 
overall effect is ambiguous, but there is at least the potential for a public policy achieving the 
opposite  of  the  desired  effect.  A  more  serious  application  is  to  that  of  illegalization  of 
recreational drugs. Making sales illegal, while making possession legal or at most a mild offense 
raises the fixed cost of conducting a transaction.
64 The more transactions, the greater the chance 
the  dealer  will  get  caught.  Consequently  the  likelihood  of  consumers  stockpiling  drugs  is   47 
increased, creating a subsequent increase in consumption due to the problem of self-control. For 
these types of goods a policy such as legalization together with a high excise tax (as is the case 
for cigarettes) may prove more effective in reducing consumption than abolition. Notice also that 
there is a difference for “temptation” goods that are durable and those, such as services, that are 
not, so criminalizing prostitution should have a different effect than criminalizing marijuana.   48 
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Appendix 
Theorem 1 (Equivalence of Subgame Perfection to the Reduced Form): Under Assumptions 
1-4, every SR-perfect Nash equilibrium profile is equivalent to a solution to the reduced form 
optimization problem and conversely. 
Proof:   The proof will make use of the fact that the payoff to the long-run self in any SR-perfect 
profile is no greater than that for any equivalent reduced form strategy. This follows from the 
fact that the payoff to the SR-perfect profile, namely  
  ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ,    
is less than 
  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    
from the definition of ￿  and the assumption of SR-perfection. 
First we show that given a solution to the reduced form optimization problem, we can 
construct  a  SR-perfect  Nash equilibrium  that is equivalent  to  it.  Note  that  it  is sufficient  to 
consider pure solutions to the reduced form optimization problem, since both players will be 
indifferent between the corresponding SR-perfect Nash equilibria. Suppose that  ￿￿ ￿  is a pure 
solution  to  the  reduced  form  optimization  problem.    We  extend  ￿￿ ￿   from  ￿￿ ￿   to  ￿   by 
defining it to be constant as a function of the history of ￿ . Because the costs of self-control is 
continuous  and  depends  only  on  the  current  state  y,  there  is  a  measurable  pure  strategy 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Let    55 
￿ ￿ ￿   be  a  SR-perfect  pure  strategy  profile  for  the  short-run  players  such  that 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  whenever  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
We claim that that the profile ( ￿￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ) is a Nash equilibrium. Since by construction the 
profile  is  SR-perfect,  we  need  only  check  that  it  is  also  long-run  optimal.  By  construction, 
( ￿￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ) gives the long-run self the same payoff as the solution to the optimization problem, 
that  is  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .    If  the  long-run  self  deviates,  the  resulting  profile 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  will still be SR-perfect, an equivalent reduced-form strategy  ￿
￿￿ ￿  exists, and by the 
first  paragraph  of  the  proof,  yields  at  least  as  high  a  payoff  as  the  deviation, 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Since  ￿￿ ￿  was a solution to the optimization problem, we have 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  so  that  the  long-run  self  did  not 
benefit from this deviation.   
Second, we show that every SR-perfect Nash equilibrium profile ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is equivalent 
to a solution to the optimization problem. Consider any equivalent reduced form strategy  ￿￿ ￿ . 
Suppose that it is not optimal. Note that by the first paragraph it yields at least as much utility as 
the equilibrium. Then there is a pure reduced form strategy  % ￿￿ ￿  and a positive constant  ￿ ￿ ￿  
such that  % ￿￿ ￿  yields a gain of  ￿ in the optimization problem over  ￿￿ ￿ . By Assumption 4, 
following each history  ￿  and  ￿ , we may find a  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that  % ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the unique best 
response of the short-run player and by Assumption 3, we may assume that  
  % % ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
Let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the strategy of playing  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . By SR-perfection, the short-run player strategy  ￿ ￿ ￿  
must play the unique best response  % ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . But this gives utility to the long-  56 
run self following each history within  ￿￿ ￿  of % ￿￿ ￿ , and so the same is true of the present value 
payoff. This implies that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  gives a gain of  ￿￿ ￿  over  ￿ ￿ ￿ , contradicting the hypothesis that 
￿ ￿ ￿  was an equilibrium strategy. 
￿ 
Theorem 3   (i)    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; if  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
(ii) When  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (9).  
Proof:  
i) Suppose that the optimum is at 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Then doing it now gives payoff of 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , while waiting one period and then conforming to the presumed optimal rule gives 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , because the agent is certain to act next period. Thus waiting is optimal unless 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , but this contradicts  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Now suppose 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Conforming to the strategy yields payoff  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , while acting yields  
 
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
,  
so acting is better if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  or  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
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(ii)  If  the  optimal  cutoff  ￿ ￿   is  in  the  interior  of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , optimality  implies  that  the  agent  is 
indifferent  between  waiting  and  acting  when 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Thus 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
which establishes (9).  
Because 
￿ ￿  maximizes steady state payoff,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ , Thus 
 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
so  
￿
￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿  if  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Now from (8) and the envelope theorem 
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
,  
So 
￿
￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿ .    ￿ 
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Consider a game between selves, one at each date t, where the date-t self has payoff  ￿ ￿￿  
if it acts, payoff 
   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 if a future self acts at date ￿ ￿ ￿ , and payoff 0 if no self ever acts.   
  First we look for a stationary equilibrium, in which each agent acts if its opportunity cost 
is less than a cut-off  ￿￿ ￿ .  Let  ￿￿ ￿  be the expected discounted sum of payoffs from tomorrow 
on if the agent does not act, so that the payoff to waiting at t with leisure opportunity  ￿ ￿  is 
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . Then   
  ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,
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 so that 
  ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
.  (10) 
The agent is indifferent about acting when  
  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , or   
  ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .                (11) 
In the supplementary on-line appendix we prove the following result 
Theorem 4:     59 
a)  If  ￿ ￿ ￿   and  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,  the  “sophisticated  quasi-hyperbolic  model”  has  a  stationary 
equilibrium with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
b) There is an open set of parameters that satisfies the restrictions of part a) and for which there 
are other equilibria. 
 
Preferences on Menus 
Theorem 5: Under Assumptions 1-5, the induced preferences  ( over choice sets satisfy set-
betweenness. That is, for all choice sets  ￿ ￿ #  either ￿ ￿ # # ) ￿ ￿  or # ￿ # ￿ ) ￿ ￿ . 
Proof
66:  Let ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the act that is chosen from W, ￿ ￿ ￿ # # ￿ ￿  be the act that is chosen from 
Z, and  ￿ ￿ ￿ $ $ ￿ ￿  be the act that  is chosen from  $ ￿ # ￿ ) , and let  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ %  be the 
corresponding temptations, that is,  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  Then  
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ * + ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
$ $ $
￿￿ ￿ #
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿
￿ ￿ )
( ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
 
Suppose without loss of generality ￿ ￿ ￿ $ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Then  
 
￿ ￿ * + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (
 
so ￿ ￿ # ) ￿ . 
  Moreover, if  ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿  then    60 
 
￿ ￿ * +
￿ ￿ * +
￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿￿ #
￿￿ #
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (
 
so ￿ # # ) ￿ ,  and set-betweenness is satisfied, while if   ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿  then  
 
￿ ￿ * + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (
 
so  ￿ # ￿ ) ￿ . 
￿ 
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Supplementary Appendices 
(to be posted on the web only) 
Appendix S1: The Consumption-Savings Model 
 
I.  We first give a result for general per-period utility functions in the simple savings model. 
Consider the problem of maximizing  
  ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
  
over  all  feasible  plans  ￿
￿
,  i.e.  plans  that  satisfy  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and  the  wealth  equation 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We suppose that  ￿  is non-decreasing and continuous on  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ; we do not 
require  continuity  on  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   because  we  want  to  allow  for  the  logarithmic  case  where 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.  Let ￿  be the supremum in this problem. 
Proposition S1.1: Suppose  ￿ ￿ ￿  and  
(S1.1)  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Then:  (i) For any feasible plan the sum defining U has a well defined value in the sense that 
either the sum converges absolutely or converges to ￿￿.  
  (ii) The supremum ￿  of the feasible values satisfies  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
  (iii)  If  feasible  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
in  the  product  topology  then  ￿ ￿
￿
  is  feasible.  If  in  addition 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 then  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
. 
(iv) An optimal plan exists. That is, there is a feasible plan that attains ￿ .   62 
 
Proof:  (i)  Define   ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
We can write any finite sum as the sum of negative and positive parts, so for any sequence ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
 
we have   
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
& ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
& ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
& ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
 
The positive part of the sum is summable from (A.1), since 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The negative part is monotone decreasing in T, so it either converges absolutely or converges to 
￿￿.  In  the  former  case  the  entire  sum  converges  absolutely;  in  the  latter  case  the  sum 
converges to ￿￿.  
 
(ii)  Part (i) already shows that ￿ ￿ ￿. To see that ￿ ￿ ￿￿, note that it is feasible to set 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for all t, and that for  ￿ ￿ ￿  this plan yields a finite value. 
 
(iii)   Consider a sequence of feasible plans  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
.  Because the constraints are period by 
period and closed, it is clear that  ￿ ￿
￿
 satisfies the constraints, so it is feasible. Now suppose in 
addition that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
. Choose any  ￿ ￿ ￿  and pick ’  large enough that  ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 
for all ￿ ’ ￿ .  If we now pick &  that      63 
  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
we know that 
   ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
for all  ￿ ’ ￿  and  & ￿ ￿ . Since per-period payoffs are continuous at any ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
,  and 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , it follows that  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ! ￿  for all  & ￿ ￿ . 
Since this is true for any  ￿ ￿ ￿  and we know that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, we conclude that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
(iv) Now consider a feasible sequence ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
. Each savings rate  ￿ ￿  must lie 
in the compact interval  ￿ ￿￿￿￿   and  each  ￿ ￿   must  lie  in  the  compact  interval  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ,  so the 
sequence  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
  has  an  accumulation  point  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
  in  the  product  topology.  This 
accumulation point is a maximum by part (iii). 
￿ 
II.  Now we specialize to the CRRA utility functions   
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
  
and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , which corresponds to the case  ￿ ￿ ￿ . Assuming 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿  implies  
  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   64 
It follows from Proposition S1.1 that an optimum 
￿ ￿
￿
 exists. 
Proposition S1.2: With CRRA utility a stationary optimum with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  exists. 
Proof: Suppose that 
￿ ￿
￿
 is an optimal plan. By homogeneity of the objective function, and the 
fact that plans are defined in terms of savings rates, 
￿ ￿
￿
 is also an optimal plan starting in period 
2 (for any initial condition). Note that the plan  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿  yields wealth in period 2 
of 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , and let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ denote the maximized utility when starting in the second period with 
wealth  ￿ ￿ . Then  
  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 
where the first equality follows because 
￿ ￿
￿
 is optimal from period 2 on, and the second equality 
because 
￿ ￿
￿
 is optimal from the first period. Proceeding in this way we can construct sequence of 
feasible  plans  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿   that  play  ￿
￿ ￿   for  the  first  ￿   periods  such  that 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
. Clearly  ￿ ￿
￿
 converges in the product topology to the plan of choosing the 
fixed savings rate  ￿
￿ ￿ . From Proposition A.1 (iii), this limiting plan is feasible and gives utility 
￿ ; that is, it is optimal. 
￿ 
 
III.  We have shown that it is sufficient to compute the present value utility from a fixed 
savings rate ￿ , and maximize over savings rates. We have present value utility     65 
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿
￿
, ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
   
Since the optimal savings rate cannot be 0 or 1, we may differentiate with respect to the saving 
rate to find 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
which gives the first-order condition for an optimum
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  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   
When  ￿ ￿ ￿  we get the usual solution 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ .  Thus we can rewrite the first order 
condition as  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
IV: Turning to the simple banking model, utility starting in the second period is the  ￿ ￿ ￿  
solution 
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￿
￿
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￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ , ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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The utility of both selves in the first period is 
 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
, 
and so the overall objective of the long-run self is to maximize 
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￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
   
The first order condition for optimal consumption is 
  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
.     
If there are one or more solutions that satisfy the constraint  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then one of them 
represents the optimum; otherwise the optimum is to consume all pocket cash.  
Note that  ￿ ￿  is the solution for  ￿ ￿ ￿ , so it satisfies   
  ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
. 
Thus we can write the first order condition as 
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
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or  
 
￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   !
￿ ￿ ￿
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Appendix S2: Hyperbolic Procrastination and Delay 
Theorem 4:   
a)  If  ￿ ￿ ￿   and  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,  the  “sophisticated  quasi-hyperbolic  model”  has  a  stationary 
equilibrium with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
b) There is an open set of parameters that satisfies the restrictions of part a) and for which there 
are other equilibria. 
proof: Substituting (10) into (11) we see that  
 
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
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￿￿ ￿￿
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" # ￿ ￿ ￿ $ % $ % $ $ % ￿ ￿ & ’
 
Let 
￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿ ￿
" # ￿ ￿ ￿ $ % ￿ ￿ $ % $ $ % ￿ ￿ & ’
 
To prove the theorem it suffices to show that there is an  ￿￿ ￿  where  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . The assumption 
that ￿ ￿ ￿  implies that    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, and the assumption that   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   
implies that   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   69 
b) Suppose that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  so that  the odd-numbered agents never act an even ones 
always act. Then the equilibrium payoff of an even-numbered  agent is  ￿ ￿￿ , and the payoff of 
an even-numbered  agent with cost  ￿ ￿  who chooses to wait is  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so the even 
agents’ strategy is a best response  for all  ￿ ￿  if  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , or equivalently 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   (S2.1) 
The payoff of the odd-numbered agents who wait is  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and the payoff to acting is 
￿ ￿￿ , so waiting is better for all  ￿ ￿  if  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  (S2.2) 
To complete the proof we must show that there is an open set of parameters such that 
(S2.1)  and  (S2.2)  and  the  restrictions  ￿ ￿ ￿   and  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ .  To  do  this,  fix  ￿ ￿ ￿   and 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  and  some  ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Set  ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,    and 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .    (Note  that  these  conditions  are  consistent  with  a  range  of  distributions, 
including the uniform.) By construction this satisfies  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  and (S2.2). 
  If 
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿  then 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and for  
 
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿￿
￿
￿
￿
 we compute that    70 
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￿ ￿
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￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
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￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
 
This shows that there is a ‘2-cyle equilibrium” whenever ￿ is sufficiently small.  Since  the 
inequalities in (12) and (13) hold strictly for the specified relationship between the parameters, 
they  hold for an  open set of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; the inequalities also hold for  a range of distributions 
with the given mean and endpoints. 
￿ 
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O’Doherty  [2004]  and  Platt  and  Glimcher  [1999].)  But  as  economists  our  primary  goal  is  a  model  that  fits 
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some  cases  of  interest.  The  conclusion  discusses  the  complications  introduced  by  forward-looking  “short-run 
selves.”    
8 Bernheim and Rangel [2004] favor the “dual systems” terminology. 
 
9As we explain below, the cash effect has the same impact in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. Note also that 
this  result  is  in  the  opposite  direction  from  those  of  Gul  and Pesendorfer  [2001,  2004],  who  do  not  consider 
environments with mechanisms such as banks that substitute for self-control. 
10 Benabou and Pycia [2002] analyze a two-period model where the long-run self and the short-run self compete for 
control by expending resources, with the probability that a given self takes control equal to its share of the total 
expenditure; it is not clear to us how to extend their model to multiple periods. Brocas and Carrillo [2005] analyze a 
two-period dual self model of a consumption-leisure choice. They focus on the case where self-control is costless, 
but the short-run self has private information, so that the long-run self offers a “menu” of consumption-effort pairs 
to the short-run self, as in agency models. 
11  More  precisely,  Gul  and  Pesendorfer  [2001]  and  Dekel,  Lipman,  and  Rustichini  [2005]  give  axioms  on 
preferences  over  static  choice  sets;  Gul  and  Pesendorfer  [2001]  complement  this  with  a  conditions  for  a 
representation of joint preferences over both choice sets and the choice from a given set. Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] 
extend their earlier representation to an infinite horizon, but only for preferences over choice sets.   
12 This assumption is a modeling convenience, but it can be relaxed to allow for history-dependent action sets. 
13 Throughout the paper all measure spaces are endowed with the Borel sigma-algebra. 
14 We allow this utility to take on the value ￿￿ but not ￿￿. 
15 Because the objective function is linear in probabilities, there will be a deterministic solution to the maximization 
problem whenever a maximum exists. We allow for mixed strategies here to facilitate comparisons of the solutions 
of the reduced-form optimization with the equilibria of the game.   72 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Each space of finite histories is a complete separable metric (Polish) space. Such a space is small enough to 
guarantee that we can find regular conditional probability measures, meaning that the conditional probabilities may 
be chosen to (almost surely) be countably additive – that is, constitute a probability measure. 
17 Because of sets of measure zero there are generally a great many equivalent reduced form strategies. 
18 Because we take the short-run self’s action to be the savings rate and not total savings, the feasible actions A are 
independent of the long-run self’s actions.  Note also that since the short-run self makes all consumption/savings 
decisions, the model satisfies our requirement that the evolution of the state depends only on the actions of the short-
run self. 
19 Krusell, Kurusac, and Smith [2005] consider a more general family of preferences; the model of this section is the 
special case of theirs in which  ￿ ￿ ￿ . (Larger values of  ￿  correspond to a temptation cost that reflects quasi-
hyperbolic discounting by the  “doer.”)  Instead of showing that the solution is stationary, we do, they take as 
primitive a stationary value function that satisfies their equation (4); they then restrict attention to cases where this 
stationary solution is the unique limit of their finite-horizon models. As they note, equation (4) can sometime admit 
multiple solutions, but in our case of  ￿ ￿ ￿  equation (4) is a contraction and has a unique solution. However, since 
infinite-horizon games can have equilibria that are not limits of exact finite horizon equilibria,  their argument seems 
to leave open the possibility that there are other equilibria where the stationarity of (4) is not satisfied.  
20  As we have written the problem, with the savings rate as the control, the state evolution equation is not concave. 
If we change variables so that the control is the absolute level of consumption  ￿ ￿ , the state evolution equation is 
linear but the per-period payoff becomes  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , which is not concave in the state if  ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
For this reason our proof technique does not rely on concavity.    We can extend the conclusion that savings are a 
constant  fraction  of  wealth  to  the  case  where  asset  returns  ￿ ￿ are  stochastic  and  i.i.d.  provided  that  there  is 
probability 0 of 0 gross return.  In the more general CRRA case studied in the Supplemental Appendix, the solution 
given there remains unchanged provided we define  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
21 Since the solution must be interior, it must satisfy the first-order condition, and since there is a unique solution to 
the first order condition, this is the optimum Krusell, Kurusucu, and Smith obtain the same formula for the savings 
rate when they specialize their model to our case. 
22 To do this, they show that equilibrium is characterized by the solution of a single-agent problem, where the 
agent’s utility function is derived from the shadow values in the original problem. When base preferences are 
CRRA, the only difference between the derived utility function and that of a “fully rational” agent (an exponential 
discounter) is that the agent gets a utility boost at zero wealth,  
23 This is true for example of the many studies cited in Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue [2004],  p. 173.   73 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 This is consistent with evidence (such as Pavlov’s bell) that the impulsive short-run self responds to learned 
behavioral cues in addition to direct stimuli Modern physiological research is making progress in identifying some 
of the brain chemistry that reflects the response to these stimuli, see, for example, Haruno et al [2004]. Camerer, 
Lowenstein and Prelec [2000] say that “roughly  speaking, it appears that similar brain circuitry  (dopaminergic 
neurons in the midbrain) is active for a wide variety of rewarding experiences (including) money rewards.” 
25 Hellwig’s [1973] Ph.D. thesis discusses a multiple-selves model of changing preferences, and applies it to a model 
of banking where “in the bank, the agent has a higher preference for savings than when he sits down for dinner.” 
Hellwig allows the interval between visits to the bank to be endogenous, and studies how it compares to the solution 
to the single-agent control problem.   
26 The Supplementary Appendix provides the parallel computations for the CRRA case. 
27 Note that in the case where the probability lottery has a positive probability, the only consequence is that  ￿
￿ ￿  
changes by a small amount. 
28 In the CRRA case with relative risk aversion  ￿ , the former also dominates as  ￿  approaches  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , which is 
relevant when  ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
29 This is because ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . . 
30 The usual daily limit in the U.S. for ATM withdrawals is $300. 
31  The relationship between pocket cash and wealth depends on ￿  and hence on the period length. The relationship 
is  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  so  for  example,  if  pocket  cash  is  $300  and  wealth  $300,000,  then  the  interest  rate 
corresponding to ￿  is 1/1000, or if the annual rate is 10%, the period between bank visits is 3-4 days. 
32 For example, a subject might be indifferent between $15 now and $60 in a year, and also be indifferent between 
$250  immediately  and  $350  in  a  year.  This  is  called  the  “magnitude  effect;”  see  Frederick,  Lowenstein,  and 
O’Donoghue [2002].  
33 The mechanism in our model is very simple, and covers only the case where the current account is for one day’s 
spending. While we do think that cash on hand has some impact on propensity to spend, and hence on risk aversion, 
even myopic agents may be able to smooth consumption over a few days. To accommodate this, we would need to 
interpret the period length in our model as the length of time over which the short-run self is willing to smooth 
consumption. This is easy to do if one takes the mental frames as exogenous. However, since mental frames are 
heuristics for responding to cognitive limits and self-control costs, it would be more satisfying to derive the nature of 
the frames from assumptions on those fundamentals.    
34 We do not know if it is the only equilibrium.   74 
                                                                                                                                                             
35 Of course businesses engage in a variety of methods to induce impulse purchasing, for example a car salesman’s 
offer to let the purchaser drive away in the car right now. 
36 We thank a referee for emphasizing the role of the environment in which these gambles will be resolved.  
37 Our later assumptions will imply that  ￿ ￿ ￿ , so that we can think of the agent continuing to enjoy leisure 
activities in every period after he acts. An alternative interpretation of this set up is that life consists of a series of 
tasks. Once a task is completed, life continues with a series of additional tasks, which we model by means of a 
continuation payoff. Procrastination here means delaying life in order to gain some short-term leisure. 
38 They suppose that there is a short-run cost  ￿ ￿ ￿  of acting, and no short run benefit of not acting, while we 
assume that the “cost” of acting is the opportunity cost of foregone leisure, but this is only a normalization 
39 Unlike the difference between costs and opportunity costs of acting, this is a substantive difference and not simply 
a  normalization,  as in  our  case  the  agent  knows  the  current  realization  of  the stochastic  term when  making  a 
decision.  
40  O’Donoghue and Rabin conjecture that their model has only one additional mixed-strategy equilibrium. The 
pure-strategy equilibria correspond to the set of limits of exact equilibria of the finite horizon games as the horizon 
goes to infinity, but this restriction relies on long chains of backwards induction and is not  robust  to even small 
payoff uncertainty, as shown by Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine [1988].  
41 We suspect that there can be many other sorts of equilibria as well, but given our focus on the dual-self model a 
full characterization is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
42 Sophisticated, “low  ￿ ” agents who have correct perceptions about the costs and benefits of the club would 
correctly forecast that they would rarely attend but take a long time to cancel, while agents who misperceive their ￿  
would expect to exercise a lot. DellaVigna and Malmendier also show that agents choose monthly or annual plans 
with no per-visit charge when it would be cheaper to pay per visit. The use of prepayment as a commitment device 
is a consequence of both the quasi-hyperbolic and dual-self models.    
43 This factor is also present in the O’Donoghue-Rabin model, but the discussion of cancellation in DellaVigna and 
Malmendier [2003] seems to use a deterministic specification for the costs of cancellation.  Also, the calibration 
measures cancellation lag by the number of full months between the last attendance and contract termination for 
users who hold a monthly contract at the time of termination.  This is a conservative estimate if the customer knows 
that she will not attend in the future by the end of the month that included the customer’s  last visit, but otherwise 
may exaggerate the amount of delay. 
44 Bodner and Prelec [2003] and Benabou and Tirole [2004] build on the idea of imperfect self-knowledge to 
develop models of “self-signalling” that they use to explain the use of  “personal rules.”  These models assume that 
the agent is uncertain of only one thing. In Benabou and Tirole [2004], for example, the agent knows the distribution 
of costs but does not know his quasi-hyperbolic parameter  ￿ . Both Bodner and Prelec [2003] and Benabou and   75 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tirole [2004] analyze Bayesian equilibria of their models, which raises the question of whether a plausible non-
equilibrium learning process would lead agents to learn the strategy of their “other selves” without learning the 
underlying value of  ￿ . The same concern arises in the O’Donoghue and Rabin  % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  model, where the agent in 
every period has quasi-hyperbolic parameter  ￿  but believes that his future play will correspond to the subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the multiple-selves game with parameter  % ￿ . Dekel et al [2004] analyze this issue in games 
between multiple agents; their results show that when  ￿  is fixed over time, assumptions that allow the agent not to 
learn  ￿  are typically too weak to justify restricting attention to equilibrium.  Thus, while agents may sometimes 
have misperceptions about their own future play, it seems hard to justify the use of equilibrium models to analyze 
these misperceptions. 
45 If consumers have heterogeneous expectations about whether the health club usage is worthwhile, then the agents 
who sign up for the health club will have relatively optimistic expectations, while those who get misleadingly 
negative draws will not sign up and hence not be part of the sample. Thus the explanation based on misperceptions 
about the attractiveness  of the health club does not require that the population as a  whole has a bias towards 
optimistic expectations.  
46 The multiple-selves version of the delay game is continuous at infinity, so from Fudenberg and Levine [1983] 
every limit of finite-horizon subgame-perfect equilibria is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the infinite horizon. 
47 They base this last hypothesis on the work of Lowenstein [1996]. 
48 Ward and Mann [2000] report a similar effect of cognitive load (a combination of a memorization task and a 
response-time task) on individuals who a pre-experiment survey identified as “restrained eaters.” 
49 See also Noor [2005] for an alternative approach to axiomization that is based on choice functions instead of 
preferences. He uses preferences on the timing of rewards to identify the agent’s normative preferences as the limit 
of preferences on rewards in the far-distant future. 
50 Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] consider an infinite-horizon dynamic programming problem. We do not compare our 
model with those axioms because they are more complicated, and because this paper does not provide axioms for the 
choices of actions to complement its axioms on choices over choice sets. 
51 Benabou and Pycia [2002] show that the equilibrium of their two-period “lobbying” model is consistent with these 
same axioms. As we remarked  earlier, the  Gul and Pesendorfer axioms are in some ways  less  restrictive than 
Assumption 5, and hence than Assumption 5’. Specifically, we constrain the “temptation” to be the foregone short-
run utility, while their axioms are consistent with other “temptation functions.”  
52 Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini point out that these preferences are consistent with either the Gul and Pesendorfer 
set-betweenness axiom or their independence axiom, but not both.     76 
                                                                                                                                                             
53 Noor [2005] gives a different example of the violation of independence of irrelevant alternatives that is not 
compatible  with  our  Assumptions  1-  5:  he  supposes  that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿ ! ￿   and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ .    Intuitively, 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿ ! ￿   implies  that  the  long  run  self  prefers  b  to  ￿ and  that  y  is  not  tempting  in  the  menu  ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ .  To 
accommodate these preferences we could relax Assumption 5 to allow the “temptingness” of a choice to depend on 
the menu from which it is chosen, or drop Assumption 1 so that self-control is not always costly.  
54 The axiom in question is Axiom 3 in both papers; it was first proposed in Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [1999]. 
Because it applies to combinations of sets of lotteries, it is not a consequence of the usual independence axiom on 
lotteries. 
55 More precisely, no monotone transformation of this function is linear in the expected value of the utilities. 
56 Gul and Pesendorfer do not specify any particular processes that might underlie their assumptions on preferences, 
so  in  particular  they  do  not  assume  that  self-control  requires  effort;  our  shows  a  difficulty  with  one  possible 
interpretation of their assumptions. The conclusion of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini mentions another possible 
reason for the failure of the independence axiom based on “guilt” as opposed to an intervening action.  
57 The “hot-cool” model originates in Metcalfe and Mischel [1999]. 
58  Lowenstein’s  [1996]  notion  of  visceral  influences  causing  people  to  “act  against  their  self-interest  in  full 
knowledge that they are doing so” can also be interpreted this way. 
59  They  also  use  their  model  to  explain  non-linear  probability  weighting  in  the  assessment  of  
 risks. 
60 In thinking about welfare criteria, it is helpful to distinguish between political economy – how we think the 
government should make decisions – and moral philosophy – how we would advise others to behave. Even if we 
believe people do make systematic errors in evaluating how various choices will influence the appropriately-defined 
measure of their “welfare,” we might not trust that the government or policy analysts would make better evaluations.  
For this reason,  it is consistent to believe both that people make mistakes and that government policy should (with a 
few exceptions) be based on the assumption that people’s actions and ex-ante predictions are the best guide to what 
is in their own interests. 
61 It is of course possible that either the short-run or long-run self or both may misperceive the future. However, 
learning makes it less likely that these misperceptions will involve frequently experienced variables such as  ￿ , or 
more broadly, one’s own ability to exercise self-control. Moreover, when little learning occurs, it is not clear why 
one should expect to see equilibrium play.   77 
                                                                                                                                                             
62 By the “standard model” here we mean that reinforcements are applied directly to actions.  Stimulus-response 
dynamics can be defined on much larger spaces of sequences of actions, hypothetical reinforcements, etc.; at that 
level of generality they encompass a much larger set of phenomena.   
63 For a particularly striking experiment where learning takes place in the absence of feedback, see Weber [2003]. 
64 The non-linearity of penalties with respect to the amount possessed works in the opposite direction; we ignore this 
effect here.   
65 Because the reward V  here is received two periods from the present, it is multiplied by ￿  but not by ￿ . 
66 This proof closely follows the intuition in Gul and Pesendorfer [2001]; we give the proof as their formal argument 
uses assumptions that we have not imposed. 
67 We do not know if the first-order condition has a unique solution, except in the logarithmic case. 